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Abstract
Technological innovation, externalities and network effects keep shifting
the preference parameters in cellular telecommunication service sector. The
paper suggests a framework to model these changes.It notes two channels that
affect the service prices (in possibly opposite ways). In each corresponding
period, consumer with lower reservation prices are shopping for the services.
But these reservation prices are going up due to complementarity/ network-
effects. Under some reasonable assumptions on industry and cost structure,
market data can be used to identify these changes.
A price index is suggested that decomposes service bundle price changes
into the change in price for same-quality of service and change in quality
of the service bundle. Some interesting properties of these indexes are also
discussed.
1 Introduction
Service bundling is pervasive specially in high-tech sector. While expla-
nations for this trend vary, there is no argument about its importance.
Bundling can be a result of monopolist trying to price discriminate (Adams
and Yellen, 1976 [1]) who wants to reduce the variance in buyers’ valuations
(Schmalensee, 1984 [12]) or it can be due to sector specific economic factors
(Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1999 [3]). There are papers talking about opti-
mal bundling strategies i.e. whether complements or substitutes should be
bundled (Venkatesh and Kamakura, 2003 [9]).
However, recognition of the fact that these service bundles represent use-
ful economic information is missing from most of these literature or very
less emphasis is put on importance of examining the composition of service
bundles.
One important distinction with high-tech products and services is that
most of the features bundled in the services are complements of each other.
Then bundling becomes more of a requirement rather than a restriction from
consumer’s point of view. Imagine people having to buy caller-id, voice-
mail, call-waiting etc. separately and then consuming them. Consumers
will have to bundle all of these anyways to enjoy any of these. I call them
technical bundles or natural bundles compared to optional or forced bundles
where a consumer may enjoy the contents of bundle separately as well (e.g.
mobile internet browsing). So what do the composition of service bundles
tell us? First it is indicative of the preference structure and technology of
that sector. Any cellular service provider will not package music and games
download portal without internet/ data plan (these are technical bundles).
Similarly each bundle is targeted toward a particular section of consumers e.g.
family package, student packages etc. This is because value of each feature
in the service bundle is different for different customers. Thus looking at the
available bundles should also inform us about the distribution of consumer
preferences.
How about the prices? Apart from papers treating bundling in the con-
text of monopoly pricing, there is a really rich branch of literature involving
product differentiation or discrete choice approach. Products are considered
a set of characteristics and consumers buy one of them depending on their
taste and other parameters (Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995 [4]). One can
derive implicit feature-prices which are reflective of consumer’s valuation of
each feature and cost structure of production process (Rosen, 1974 [11]).
But if these implicit prices represent what I call inherent value of a fea-
ture, then changes in these prices should be treated as changes in prefer-
ence parameters (to some extent, because these prices could also change
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due to changes in supply side/ cost structure). This is a fact which not many
are willing to accept and even fewer are trying to work on it.
This paper deals with this type of inherent quality change. Same set
of features (i.e. same data plan) gives more utility in the corresponding
period due to some externality (i.e. availability of Google Search for mobile),
then optimal allocation will have consumer increase their consumption of
data transfer. But this kind of externality and resulting substitution might
happen with-in service itself (i.e. between features). For example availability
of video and audio content makes consumer valuation of Sound and Video
card go up. The bundle composition and price will change (in later periods)
to reflect these changes.
The problem with current papers on hedonic regression is that quality
is regarded mostly as quantity of features. I admit that the literature on
’exact’ hedonic price indexes (Feenstra, 1995 [6]) discusses how to compare
costs of attaining the ’same utility’ in two periods. But it talks more about
changes in characteristics’ value due to bundle-composition changes. For
example value of Data plan is higher for the corporate Blackberry users.
That concept is more like what I call Usage Profile. But what about
change in the unit value of feature itself (in all kind of bundles) i.e. the
increase in utility for a particular feature due to technological innovation and
other externalities? I admit that this line of thinking implies that preference
parameters are changing over time and that is an area which involves many
other issues. That is why the papers (on ’exact’ hedonic price index) employ
Random Utility model or involve dealing with distribution of preferences over
characteristics and as a result end up being too complicated to solve without
making many assumptions. But that should not deter us from finding easier
ways to look at this issue. We can not ignore it altogether specially in
high-tech sector where pace of innovation has been (and probably will be) is
remarkable.
The above issue is also important in the context of productivity anal-
ysis. Papers suggest accounting for high-tech input good’s characteristics
(Triplett, 1996 [13]), but that is just the first step. Treating productivity
of these features as constant is unrealistic assumption since the industry is
innovating at very fast pace. As an example if we are studying productivity
of computer as an input, then in consecutive periods software may be becom-
ing more period compared to hardware due to increase in software quality
or other technological factors. Hence, increase in productivity of few fea-
tures (relative to others) and increase in overall productivity (that pertains
to all the features) should be identified properly to account for increasing the
measurement efficiency and crediting the proper sub-input (e.g. computer
software)
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In cost-of-living CPI, hedonic regression coefficients (or implicit feature
prices) represent not only consumer’s valuation but also the cost parameters.
Disentangling this classical simultaneity problem requires strong assumption
on industry and cost structure. But fortunately, services are different from
goods. One can not create the services in advance and store them in in-
ventories (Hill, 1999 [8]). Most of the production process is instantaneous.
In high-tech service sector where production is just the capacity utilization
(fixed cost), under some assumptions on the industry structure these regres-
sion coefficients along with service composition have a relationship that is
useful for price statisticians.
The paper combines the ideas of normalization(Diewert, 2001 [5]) and he-
donic imputation method to develop projection approach for creating equivalent-
quality price index.
Another implication that comes out of this paper (which has been stressed
many times) is the need to have more than one index to fully understand the
changes in cost-of-living between periods. If we say that quality-adjusted
price of a mobile service plan has gone down by 10% compared to 2 yrs
ago, we are not telling that an average service plan now has four time as
much SMS and we are also not telling that a same service plans give 15%
more utility now because of proliferation of numerous mobile websites and
applications.
2 Consumer Optimization
I use the setup that is typical in hedonics and bundling literature. There is a
good X and service bundle S which comprises of (N+1) features [F0, F1, F2, ..., FN ].
Consumer gets utility from consuming X and features F0, F1, ..FN . Utility
function follows usual assumptions.
There are M such service bundles with service composition matrix QS.
Preference for X does NOT change due to any externality or network ef-
fects. We could think of X as a composite good that represent items required
for subsistence e.g. food etc. There is Quality Neutral Feature F0 which is
also immune from externalities.
Another addition compared to usual models is that one of the features is
brand name. It represent prestige, product reliability perception, friendliness
of support staff and other non-measurable features.
Consumer’s problem can be written as -
maxs,x U(f, x) s.t. P.s+ x ≤ I ; s.QS = f (1)
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In equation 1 above, P is the price vector for service bundles (in terms of
good X) and f is the feature vector. We can rewrite the problem as that of
choosing the features directly.
maxf,x U(f, x) s.t. P.(QS)
−1.f + x ≤ I (2)
The budget constraint above is obtained by 1 substituting s from second
constraint in equation 1.
If we treat P.(QS)
−1 as implicit price vector β, then optimization problem
in equation 2 becomes usual utility maximization.
First Order conditions imply that following should hold -
δU
δf0
δU
δx
= β0 (3a)
δU
δfi
δU
δfj
=
βi
βj
(3b)
Equations 3 denote the two wedges consumer uses to shifts his allocation.
1. Inter-sector substitution is shown in equation 3a. It has nothing
new. A reduction in β0 will result in consumer buying more of feature
0.
2. Intra-sector substitution is guided by equation 3b. This is the chan-
nel by which changes in utility due to externality end up being reflected
as changes in the service composition. Suppose that due to some tech-
nical innovation, each unit of feature i consumed starts giving more
utility (i.e. utility function shifts up in fi). Then even in the absence
of relative implicit price change (i.e. βi
βj
constant) consumer will want
to increase his consumption of feature i (to achieve optimal allocation).
Continuing the scenario above, assume that consumer was buying some
quantity of one of the service bundles whose feature composition exactly
matched his optimal allocation (actually it just has to be in the same ratio).
Now think what happens if there are some costs involved in changing the
feature composition to its new optimal values. If producer can just change
the prices such that increase in δU
δfi
is offset by corresponding increase in βi ,
then consumer’s optimal allocation remain the same (or in same ratio) as in
the bundle being offered.
1It is implicitly assumed that QS can be inverted
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2.1 Preferred-Bundle Surfaces
Equation 3b imply that for each value of f0 there is a vector [f1, f2, ...fN ] that
consumer would like to buy. It means that in N+1 dimension space there
are surfaces (set of vectors) which represent consumer’s optimal allocation
or preferred bundles.
Till now, I have put no restrictions on which services (or how many of
them) can consumer buy. As is typical in models of discrete choice/ product
differentiation), I assume that consumer buys only one of the services and
their is consumer heterogeneity.
This heterogeneity is along two lines. First is in their brand affinity.
Second is in their usage profile. Brand affinity is that everything else being
equal, consumer values one brand more than other. To be more concrete,
assume that he gets some extra utility from consuming his favorite brand (and
nothing extra if consuming bundle from someone else).2 Consumer’s usage
profile is related to his preference for different features and the technology
of the sector. e.g. for cellular service plan the consumer could be a student
(gives more value to the SMS), a business person (more value to the emails/
data plan)or a family person (calls are more important).
Modeling of brand as a feature of product itself makes all introduces the
product differentiation without the complexity of vertical and horizontal fea-
tures. If brand feature have a low feature-price, then they are like horizontal
feature. This is a different and more flexible approach than using a ’brand
intensity’ parameter (Perloff and Salop, 1985 [10]). For example if brand
prices for HP and DELL are quite close for a consumer, these are horizontal
features for him (i.e. brand intensity is low), but if for Apple he has strong
liking meaning brand-price is higher then it is a vertical feature for him (i.e.
brand intensity is high OR not easily substitutable).
The concept of marginal value of a characteristic in a good (Feenstra,
1995) is same as consumer heterogeneity between different usage profiles.
With this kind of setup, the feature space will have multiple ’preferred
bundle-surfaces’. Producers offer services by bundling these features to-
gether, which is equivalent to positioning their products in the feature space.
2.2 Choosing among non-optimal bundles
Applying the spatial competition concept to features space (actually the
multi-dimensional version) there is a literature on address models (Archibald,
2This will increase the dimension of feature space due to these dummy brand features.
But since most of the high-tech service industry have only 3-4 players, I think this should
not be an issue.
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Eaton and Lipsey, 1982 [2]). Most of these either derive consumer demand by
assuming that consumer chooses the product that is ’nearest’ to his preferred
choice or minimizes the distance (Fixler and Zieschang, 1992 [7]). This is
obvious in one dimensional space, but in multi-dimensional it is not that
straight-forward. Since consumer does not value each feature same, there is
no reason why distance from his preferred location in each dimension should
be treated the same.
A more appropriate concept will have the utility maximized among the
available non-optimal choices. That is to have the utility as close to optimal-
bundle utility as possible.
If we assume that U(f,x) is separable in u(f) and u(x). Then using first
order Taylor series approximation for u(f) around optimal bundle f*, we get
-
u(f) = u(f ∗) +
δu(f ∗)
δf
.(f − f ∗) (4)
This can be rewritten using the first order conditions as -
u(f)− u(f ∗) = (
δu
δf0
β0
).[β.(f − f ∗)] (5)
Equation 5 is the loss function that consumer tries to minimize when
choosing among non-optimal bundles. Now if we define β˜ = [1, β1
β0
, β2
β0
, ....., βN
β0
]
, then above can be re-written as -
u(f)− u(f ∗) = ( δu
δf0
).[β˜.(f − f ∗)] (6)
This objective function 6 shows the two substitution wedges we discussed
earlier.
Consumer optimizes in two ways. First is between other good and bun-
dled service (appears as term δu
δf0
). Once given that (i.e. deciding how much
to spent on bundled service compared to other good), he chooses a bundled
based on relative implicit prices (or relative valuations, if we think producer
is a monopolist charging the value of each feature).
This is one of the main point this paper makes. Income share spent on
a particular service bundle tells how consumer values that service compared
to other goods. But service bundles offered in the market tell us about the
relative value he puts on each of the feature with-in the service bundle (using
prices and feature composition data).
Why do we need to treat two substitutions differently (one between good
and service and second one between features within the service). There are
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two main reasons. I have already discussed one of them which is the pace of
innovation in high-tech service sector and externalities effecting the utility
each period. Because of this the market data does not only represent the
substitution due to price changes, but also reflects the changes in inherent
value of single unit of various features due to innovation. The other reason
has to do with our ability to extract any meaningful information from market
data. In reality we do not observe consumer’s valuations for each feature. So
unless we make some strict assumption on cost and industry structure, it is
hard to claim that hedonic regression coefficients (or implicit prices) represent
these valuations. But the way high-tech service production works (in most
of the cases anyways), we can deduce these valuations with realistic-enough
assumptions.
3 Production Side
There are M producers. Each has a capacity vector Km, representing the
maximum amount of each feature it can serve in each period.3 I assume
that these producers have plenty of capacity, so that congestion and load
balancing issues don’t appear in the decision making process.
Each producer offers a service bundle for each usage-profile. In each
usage-profile each producer has some brand reach(i.e. there are consumers
with positive valuation for its brand). Preferences are identical with-in a
usage profile, but differ between them.
For each of the bundle producer offers, there is fixed cost C, which can be
thought of as sticker or menu change cost (e.g. advertising, billing software
changes etc.). For each unit of bundle it sells the producer incurs a constant
cost, c. This c is like account setup and maintenance costs.
As mentioned earlier, the price vector P for all these services within each
usage profile can be represented as -
P = β.QS (7)
In equation 7 above, QS is the feature composition of all the bundles
available in the usage-profile.
I want to mention again that since consumers are heterogeneous in their
valuation for different features, the hedonic regressions coefficients β should
be treated as representing the valuation (or reservation price) only if it is run
within the usage-profile.
3The capacity can be in different unit for different features. e.g. maximum number of
calls a cell phone provider’s network can support at given time.
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The β above is same as the one obtained in equation 2 by combining his
two constraints.
The discussion below is in the context of a usage profile.
Producer’s problem can be written as -
maxqs (p− c).D(qs) s.t. D(qs).qs ≤ Km ; p = β.qs (8)
where D(qs) is demand for producer’s service bundle qs. The assumption
here is that a producer can not unilaterally change β.
This kind of cost structure is common in high-tech industry. Once wireless
internet infrastructure is setup, it does not cost anything extra (assuming no
congestion) if people use 1MB of it or 1GB. OR once the mobile game and
music download website is setup, it does not matter if the person downloads
only 1 song or 10 songs.
3.1 Demand Determination
How is demand D(qs) determined? In general, within each usage profile there
is a distribution of valuations or reservation prices of consumers for each
feature which is indicative of consumers characteristics, specially his income.4
There is also a distribution of consumer reservation prices along brand feature
dimensions, with each consumer having a positive reservation price for only
one of the brands (rest are zero) and there are few consumers for each brand.
If the producer offers a service bundle that is in-line with consumer’s
optimal allocation he buys it. Since we have not put the usual restriction
that he can buy only 1 quantity, only the proportional composition matters.
I am assuming that he can buy any quantity ≥ 1 of the service plan. It makes
more sense to think that these bundles are bought in positive numbers, but
theoretically they don’t have to be. This can raise objections like people can
not use 1.5 cellular service plans. That is true, but this is the fact that many
cellular service provider are realizing and offering flexible plans. So that one
can in fact consume 1.5 times number of minutes in the original plan, 1.5
times number of MMS etc.5 But that is besides the point. The idea here
is to identify the participation decision without making too restrictive
distribution assumptions. I am ignoring the non-participating consumers
that might decide to reduce their consumptions of other goods, so that they
4Other characteristics could be how much does he travel or even how concerned he is
with the studies linking brain-tumor to cellular use.
5How about 1.5 times the cellular phone no? Well he can have two phone numbers.
Have call-forwarding enabled in one of them. Give 50% of his contacts the other second
phone number.
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can just buy one unit of the service bundle. This is based on availability of
outside options available to these non-participating consumers which provide
same benefits (e.g. non-bundled cellular services, use internet at home for
sending-receiving text messages).
Now let us consider the industry and producers in Game theoretical setup.
Some interesting economic forces play a role in restricting producers choice
and making the analysis easy.
Consider a strategy profile where in each period all producers agree on
the cut-off reservation price matrix i.e. they decide on β (except brand
prices). So consumers below this cut-off will not buy any service bundle
(because their optimal allocation demands less than 1 of the bundle which
is not available). Notice that each producer will have some of the consumers
buying their service bundles if they charge brand price of zero. Each will
also have some of their brand consumers not buying any service bundle.
Suppose a producer increases the price of his bundle. Since brand-name
is considered one of the features by consumers, what happens is that instead
of changing the whole β it is perceived as just an increase in brand price for
that producer. There will be cross brand movements when its consumers
try to minimize their loss function and they will end up buying from someone
else (who is charging zero brand price).
If distribution of brand reservation prices is flat (i.e. most of the brands
are identical), the gains from increased prices will be much smaller than loss
due to reduction in demand. Hence none of the producers changes its price.
Π(p) ≤ Π(p = β.qs) (9)
Note that the result is being driven by the fact that costs do not depend on
service composition qs (which is not too restrictive an assumption in high-tech
service industry e.g. telecommunication) and from the fact that consumers
are not tied to their preferred location (each direction is worth maximum
up-to its reservation price).
A decrease in price by single producer will not induce any cross brand
movement toward itself from the buying consumers because other brands’
consumers are already at their optimal allocations. It will however have
some of the non-buying consumers to start buying. But this increase will
not be large, because these are low-valuation consumers and the value for
brand feature is small compared to other features for which they are paying
more than their reservation prices.
How about service composition? If every producer offers the bundles
which have feature composition proportional to consumer’s optimal allocation
(for that usage profile) F*, then each will get demand from their brand-
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consumers (i.e. consumers with positive reservation price for their brands).
To determine whether this is a feasible strategy profile, let’s consider a
deviation from it. Suppose one of the producer starts offering some more
quantity of one of the features at the same price. It will be perceived as
brand discount without affecting the β. It would have increased its demand
inducing cross brand movements if not for the fact that its service bundle is
not proportional to optimal allocation anymore. Moreover, its own brand-
consumers will no longer find this service bundle optimal and will compare
their utility differences between this and other brand bundles which are still
optimal except for the brand feature.
The actual movement is hard to predict without assumptions on distri-
bution of reservation prices in the features space. But if consumers have low
valuations for the brands (and free to move between bundles), fear of losing
its own brand customer will act as a deterrent to locate its service bundle
away from preferred surface.
D(qs) =
{
+ve; if qs ∝ F ∗
0; otherwise
For this logic to work, there is an implicit assumption. Distribution is
such that the cost of offering a NEW additional bundle is not recovered by
the residual demand for that NEW bundle.
The basic idea is that if the same producer is going to get the revenue
from sale of any of the features, he has no incentive to induce any intra-
service substitution. Service composition does not matter to the producer.
If he can offer only one bundle it is best for him to offer what his consumers
want (or most of them want).
Another economic force at work here is market saturation. Producer’s
gains in demand from price reduction (directly or by changing service com-
position) generate additional demand from low valuation consumer. But the
same objective he can achieve by using his second leverage in conjunction
with other producers by lowering cut-off reservation price. So if there are
enough consumers left (market saturation is low) and their capacities are
fixed; then producers have no incentive to compete. Hence in place of fight-
ing for the same consumers they can all have new consumers up to their
capacity.
3.2 Proportional Changes
The hedonic equation for a usage profile is depicted in equation 10. As long
as features offered remain proportional to optimal allocation there is no cross
brand movement.
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
P1 = β0.f
1
0 + β1.f
1
1 + ...+ βN .f
1
N
..............
Pk = β0.f
k
0 + β1.f
k
1 + ...+ βN .f
k
N
..............
PM = β0.f
M
0 + β1.f
M
1 + ...+ βN .f
M
N
(10)
Note that even though feature composition of each service is proportional
to the optimal allocation F*, the prices need not be proportional. Because
producers can charge different price for their brand feature. This can be
re-written as - 
P1 = β0.(f
1
0 +
β1
β0
.f 11 + ...+
βN
β0
.f 1N)
..............
Pk = β0.(f
k
0 +
β1
β0
.fk1 + ...+
βN
β0
.fkN)
..............
PM = β0.(f
M
0 +
β1
β0
.fM1 + ...+
βN
β0
.fMN )
(11)
This equation is analogous to 6 and is same as -
P = β0 ∗ β˜.QS (12)
If a producer changes the features’ composition by increasing or decreas-
ing the amount of all the features in same ratio α (so that its service bundle
is still optimal), but keeps his price fixed.
Pk =
β0
α
(α.fk0 + α.
β1
β0
.fk1 + ...+ α.
βN
β0
.fkN) (13)
Since consumers can still reach their optimal allocation by buying dif-
ferent quantities of this service bundle, the producer does not lose any de-
mand. It induces cross brand movements toward itself because other brand-
consumers can achieve their optimal allocation (except brand feature) at a
much lower price.
But if one producer does that, each producer has an incentive to do the
same to retain their consumer. They will have to incur the fixed cost C
for offering the new bundle. So as long as it does not make their operation
unprofitable, they will also increase each feature by ratio α.
Effectively what it ends up doing is setting up a new β1 = β
α
. This just
means that the cut-off reservation price vector has gone down. So some new
consumers start buying service bundles.
Above discussion might seem too restrictive. But relaxing some of the
assumptions should not change the basic intuition. Just like on consumption
side, there are two wedges. One is to have consumers buy more or less of the
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service bundle (s ↑↓) i.e. substitution between other good and service. The
other is substitution between features (QS changing). This second wedge
is becomes less important (vanishes) if the producer can not increase his
demand by positioning his service bundle at some other location.
There is another reason which might enforce this kind of behavior in
high-tech service sector. It is the presence of outside option. If consumers
can get ’customized bundle’ (may be at a higher price), then service bundle
producers have even more incentives to locate their feature composition at
consumer’s optimal.
4 Externalities and Price Changes
One mechanism of price change is already discussed above. If producers de-
cide to reduce the cut-off reservation price β, then prices for existing bundles
go down. Producers might want to do that to make better use of their capac-
ity which was under-utilized in last period. OR they might have increased
their capacity so now they can afford to serve more quantities of bundles.
The price reduction (i.e. lowering the cut-off reservation price) comes at
a cost of losing revenue from high-value customers. This is the reason why
most of the cellular companies insists on service contracts. This way they
can lock in higher valuation consumers at their reservation price and then
in next period increase their utilization by offering service bundles to lower
valuation consumers.
More important mechanism of the price change in high-tech sector is due
to externalities and network effects from technology innovation. This changes
the inherent utility of (unit value of) some features to go up. This is what
most of the hedonic regression literature does not deal with.
Using the consumer optimization equation 3b, we see that if technolog-
ical innovation moves the utility function up along feature i (i.e. δU
δfi
shifts
up for all values) the previous allocation no longer remain optimal. This is
equivalent to saying the reservation price for feature i has gone up for all
consumers. So if producers know this and want their bundle to remain opti-
mal (so that they can sell those without having to create new bundles which
requires bundling cost), they will just change prices such that βi goes up by
the exact amount such that equation 3b holds.
This second channel (due to technical innovation) does not have any effect
on β0, hence optimization equation 3a also holds.
It means that in each period we have to look for two types of information
in the service bundle prices data. They represent substitution between good-
and-service and between features with-in a service.
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{
β˜i ↑↓; if MUi ↑↓ uniformly
β0 ↑↓; otherwise
In reality, we do not see all the service bundles being exactly identical
(even within a usage-profile). There may be several reasons for it. The most
obvious is that consumer preferences are not evenly distributed along the
feature space. This fact combined with the fact that few producers develop
’specialization’ in few features (or have higher brand price for some usage
profile) will have the effect of many different kind of service bundles in the
market. Also if some of the producers can not afford to offer a separate bundle
for each usage-profile, they might end up offering something in between. But
most of them should offer quite similar bundles.
Another trend that is visible in the service market is having flexible
bundles which we discussed while talking about consumer demanding non-
integer quantity of the bundle. There are some features that are offered in
fixed ratios, but for other features consumer can buy extra. This has to
do with extracting more surplus, while allowing consumer to move toward
his preferred location and proper capacity utilization without offering a new
service bundle or changing the existing one. This kind of flexibility also
enhances the corporation among the producers.
It is easy to find an example illustrating the difference between inherent
quality change and the marginal value of feature in the good as used in
exact hedonic price index literature. Cellular service bundles offer family
plan, corporate plan and student plan by packaging number of minutes, text-
messaging and internet/ data transfer. The marginal value of per KB of
data (or internet access) is different in each plan, with it being maximum for
corporate plan users and minimum for family plan users. These are usage
profiles I talked about. So what is technological innovation then? It will
be something like the increase in applications and websites for mobile (e.g.
yahoo messenger, google maps). As a result value of per KB of data in ALL
the plans goes up. And this is not because their compositions have changed,
but because quality of per KB of internet access in cellular service plan has
increased.
Basically, the result that production model implies is that service bun-
dle offered are in-line with consumers’ optimal allocations. To increase their
profits producers lower the cut-off price to include more consumers. We can
get these results by just assuming a monopoly in each brand, and consumer
buying only if bundle is in-sync with his allocation otherwise he choses out-
side option. But I want it to be more realistic and that is why I have low
reservation price along the brand feature axis kind of setup.
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5 Service COL Indexes - Price and Quality
Building on the concepts discussed earlier, I try to identify economic informa-
tion from the price and quantity data along with the feature composition of
service bundles. In particular, how much does the Quality (that is the value-
per-unit) changes and how much does the constant-quality-price changes.
The logic is simple. If features do not have any marginal costs, then the
effect of industry wide cost shocks or structural changes will be even (i.e.
it will not make one of the feature relatively costly or cheaper to provide).
Hence all the implicit prices should be effected in similar way (otherwise pro-
ducer has to change its service bundle which is costly). Basically a producer
(in corporation with all the other producers) has two leverages to use. One
is to change the implicit price of some features (disproportional change), but
this will end up him incurring loss due to bundles becoming non-optimal un-
less this implicit price change keeps current bundle as optimal. That means
producers will change implicit prices disproportionally only when there is
an increase in the reservation price (i.e. utility shift) of few features. The
other lever is to change implicit prices proportionately. This way they can
manipulate how many of their potential consumers they want to sell in this
period depending on their capacity.
If that is the case, then market data should enable us to identify and sep-
arate these two. What is the need to decompose these changes? Of course,
the more we know the better. But apart from satisfying academic curiosity,
this information is useful both in estimating the effect of technological inno-
vation from consumer’s perspective (beyond the usual per-unit-feature price
reduction) and also in calculating cost-of-living indexes more accurately.
In each period we observe service bundle prices P, service bundle compo-
sition QS and quantities sold for each bundle S.
The first step is to identify the usage profiles. For example in mobile
phone services consumers can be office users, family users, weekend users,
messaging users etc.
For each usage profile the preferences are similar and hence the above
results could be used. Once we know how to extract information from data
for one usage profile, it is just a matter of repeating the same exercise and
then doing the aggregation (using weights).
Within each usage profile, we run following hedonic regression for each
period (because potentially reservation prices might change due to innova-
tion).
P = Rˆ.QS +  (14)
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To match this with discussion in previous sections, Rˆ above is estimated
value of β.
The crucial and new step is to construct an Equivalent Quality value
for each service. This is the amount of quality neutral feature (f0) that is
equivalent to the service bundle. In a sense this is a combination of both
normalization and imputation.
n0 = q0 +
Rˆ1
Rˆ0
.q1 + ....+
RˆN
Rˆ0
.qN (15)
Basically what I am doing is projecting the utility (reservation prices)
from all the other features on the f0 axis. This will enable us to compare like
with the likes. The scenario I am trying to address is same one unit of feature
fi giving more utility in next period. Then how do you compare services in
these two periods (which one gives more utility). It is by comparing this
equivalent quality value of feature f0. Since f0 is quality neutral, comparing
it in two periods does not pose any problem.
Rewriting 15 for all the services in the usage profile for that period, we
get -
N0 =
Rˆ.QS
Rˆ0
(16)
P = Rˆ0.N0 +  (17)
Equation 17 has a very simple interpretation. It is a set of M equations.
It tells that service sold during this period were equivalent to N0 of quality
neutral feature and the price for that feature in the period was Rˆ0. I will use
this equation to derive some interesting results.
This gives us a unique price Rˆ0 which is easily comparable across the pe-
riods. Rˆ0 combined with total equivalent quantity of quality-neutral feature
N0.S (using quantity vector S for base or current periods as weights) can be
used to construct Equivalent Quality Laspeyres, Paasche or Fisher price
indexes in the service sector.
PEQL =
Rˆ10(N
1
0 .S
0)
Rˆ00(N
0
0 .S
0)
(18)
PEQP =
Rˆ10(N
1
0 .S
1)
Rˆ00(N
0
0 .S
1)
(19)
PEQF = (P
EQ
L .P
EQ
P )
1
2 (20)
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The terms in brackets (N.S terms) represent the corresponding service
quality index. These EQ indexes will give us estimates of price change very
close to the conventional Laspeyres, Paasche or Fisher price indexes when
there is no externality or technology innovation. In case of shift in preferences
these indexes will be a better measure of constant utility price changes,
because conventional price indexes just ignore this shift.
We can even get more information using this projection approach.
Suppose feature compositions of different service bundles are not exactly
the same (say for some reasons few features are available only with certain
provider e.g. iPhone is locked and available only with AT&T ), then us-
ing quantities of bundles sold as weights we can calculate average Service
Quality for each period using the equivalent quality value for each service.
navg.s =
(n1.s1 + ...+ nM .sM)
(s1 + ..+ sM)
(21)
Service Quality defined by 21 can be reduced to following expression if
we use the set of equations represented by equation 17.
navg.s =
(P1.s1+...+PM .sM ) +µ
Rˆ0
(s1 + ..+ sM)
(22)
navg.s =
P avg.s
Rˆ0
+ ν (23)
Here µ and ν are functions of error term .
Equation 23 is another intuitive relation. It tells that average Service
Quality is equal to average price of the Service divided by the price of the
quality-neutral feature (the unit of measurement of the quality) plus some
estimation error.
5.1 Properties
The idea of this kind of decomposition can be made clear using an example.
Suppose cellular phone service bundles consist of minutes of call, number
of MMS and KB of Data. Assume that utility from a single minute of call
remains same (i.e. technology is already quite developed). To compare vari-
ous different bundles in consecutive periods, one way is to find the ’matched
sample’. Projection approach removes the need to find matched sample. It
converts each cellular service bundle into equivalent of total minutes by
converting the other innovation sensitive features MMS and Data into value-
equivalent of minutes. Thus for each service bundle we can have a number
(i.e. equivalent of total minutes) which can be compared across the periods
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since the effect of innovation is negligible in this feature. This combined
with the estimated unit price of one minute of call will enable us to estimate
various indexes we might be interested in.
I now discuss some of the properties of these indexes.
P1: These Equivalent Quality price indexes defined above are close to
conventional indexes.
Proof:
PL =
P 1.S0
P 0.S0
=
(Rˆ10.N
1
0+
1).S0
(Rˆ00.N
1
0+
0).S0
= PEQL , if ’s = 0.
The nearer ’s are to zero, the closer these indexes will be to conventional
indexes.
P2: These EQ price indexes are independent of choice of quality-neutral
feature.
Proof:
We can use ni in equation 15 and use it along with Rˆi to define the price
indexes.
PEQL =
Rˆ1i (N
0
i .S
0)
Rˆ0i (N
0
i .S
0)
= (P
1−1).S0
(P 0−0).S0 = P
EQ
L
P3: Total value of service bundles purchased in each period is equal
(almost) to price of quality-neutral feature times service quality in terms of
that feature times total number of service bundles i.e
[ Value = (Constant-Quality-Price * Quality) * Quantity ] holds in each
period.
Proof:
This is straight-forward result of equation 17.
V = P.S = (Rˆ0.N0 + ).S = (Rˆ0.N0.S) + ψ
P4: Price changes in the service bundles can be decomposed into changes
due to quality-price movements and changes due to movements in service
quality.
Proof:
This just follows from equation 17, taking derivative w.r.t. time, we get -
δP
δt
= R0(t).
δN0
δt
+N0(t).
δR0
δt
P4: Implicit EQ Quantity indexes are similar to usual quantity indexes,
but using QUALITY as weights rather than prices.
Proof:
By definition we have -
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QEQL =
P1.S1
P0.S0
PEQL
=
(
ˆ
R1
0
.N10+
1).S1
(
ˆ
R0
0
.N0
0
+0).S0
ˆ
R1
0
(N1
0
.S0)
ˆ
R0
0
(N0
0
.S0)
⇒ QEQL ≈ N
1
0 .S
1
N10 .S
0
This has the exact formulation as QL =
P 1.Q1
P 1.Q0
with Qualities N of service
bundles as weights rather than their prices P.
5.2 Technological Innovation
Consider the case when due to technological innovation, utility of feature i
goes up. If producers corporate on increasing the β˜i, then none of the service
bundle changes and only difference will be the price increase (i.e. P 1 > P 0).
Now none of the conventional indexes will reflect this fact. Moreover,
Laspeyres index will show it as a price increase ( PL > 1), which means that
price of service bundle went up. It seems counter-intuitive that innovation
lead to an increase in price.
If we calculate PEQL this will also show that the price has increased. But
since we have the two separate values Rˆ0 and N0 identified in the process,
we could tell exactly what is going on.
Since Rˆ10 = Rˆ
0
0 and N
1
0 > N
0
0 , it means that there was no change in the
’constant quality price’, but innovation increased the ’service quality’ itself
went up. That is why the price of service went up.
If we consider the usual definition of quality (which is the amount of
features a bundle has), nothing has changed. It still has the same amount of
each feature including feature fi. What has increased is the inherent value
or quality of per unit of feature i. This is the distinction I want to emphasize.
This simple example shows that the EQ indexes are better than conven-
tional indexes in explaining price changes when there is a shift in preferences
due to some externality or network effects, which is quite common in high-
tech service sector.
The importance of this approach becomes more apparent if we consider
another example. Suppose that along with β˜i going up as above, producers
also decide to use their other leverage by reducing the average/ cut-off reser-
vation price (may be the technological innovation also helped them to serve
more customers within the existing capacity).
If increase in βi is large enough (compared to the agreed overall reduction
α) then the prices of service bundles might go up.
P 1 = (1− α).P 0 + (β1i − β0i ).Qi > P 0
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Since service bundles are the same in two periods, using conventional
indexes will give us the result that prices have increased and hence the wel-
fare has gone down. But this will be quite opposite to what has actually
happened.
Now if we calculate the constant-quality prices we can clearly see that
Rˆ10
Rˆ00
= (1− α)
So the constant-quality prices have in fact gone down. The prices have
gone up because the service quality has gone up by a larger amount, so the
net effect is that total price for the service bundle goes up.
In first example, conventional indexes failed to identify the quality-improvements.
But in second example, they predicted the price movement in the opposite
direction (quality improvements were quite large in this case).
So even if we are not interested in the fine details of decomposing the
price movements in service bundles to its components, ignoring it altogether
or thinking that it is not large enough to matter can be costly.
5.3 Aggregation
We can calculate Constant-quality price Laspeyres index and Service-
quality Laspeyres index using Rˆ0 and N0 for each period as prices and
quantities of service bundle sold S as weights. Note that Rˆ0 will be same for
each of the services in the usage profile, but will differ across profiles. I am
using the symbol R¯0 to denote the vector of these Rˆ0.
6
PRL =
R¯10.N
0.S0
R¯00.N
0.S0
(24)
PNL =
N¯10 .S
0
N¯00 .S
0
(25)
The constant-quality price index PRL uses total equivalent quantity of
feature 0 (i.e. N.S) as weights.
If we use two-stage aggregation and calculate EQ price indexes. These in
general will not be equal to the product of constant-quality-price index and
service-quality index.
(PEQL )
Two−Stage 6= PRL .PNL
6This R¯0 is created first by dividing P and QS data by profiles and then running hedonic
regression in each profile.
19
6 Illustrations
Utility function is U(F, x) = fα00 ∗fα11 ∗..∗fαNN ∗xαx . The optimality conditions
are -
q0 =
α0 ∗ I
β0
(26)
qj
qi
=
αj
αi
∗ βi
βj
(27)
These equations are two wedges I discussed. Producer uses first one to
increase his demand to utilize his capacity. The second one is used to keep
current service bundle optimal (and hence save the bundling-cost) in response
to changes in preference parameters due to some technological externality.
In figures below, I draw graphical representation of these.
In figure 1, consumers’ preferred planes are drawn in two feature space
(Number of minutes, qj and Data transfer qi). I have shown two lines each
representing a usage profile. Family users value voice calls more than data
transfer, while for business users it is opposite. Figure 2 shows two mech-
anism of price changes. Once producers have decided to have their relative
implicit prices such that their service bundles are optimal planes given by
equation 27, they can adjust their total demand by changing the value of β0.
This is equivalent of deciding up to what minimum income consumer they
wish to sell given equation 26. Again, I am abstracting from the process that
might take place if consumer decides to consumer less of X, so that he can
purchase one unit of service bundle.
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Data Transfer (in KB)
N
o
.
ofM
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utes
Preferred Plane (Family)
Preferred Plane (Business)
Cut-Off Points
qj
qi
(αj
αi
)family > (αj
αi
)business
Figure 1: Preferred Planes and Cut-Off Points in Feature Space
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Data Transfer (in KB)
N
o
.
ofM
in
utes
qj
qi
New Preferred Plane (due to Tech. Innovation)
Channel 1 (Inter-Service) Channel 2 (Intra-Service)
Externality ⇒ αi
αj
↑⇒ New Optimal Planes
if Producers βi
βj
↑⇒ Same bundle still Optimal.
Figure 2: Price change mechanisms
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7 Conclusions
The issue of utility gains due to externalities and technological innovation
which is in addition to the most often talked about quality improvements
(per-unit-feature-price reduction) is important for welfare analysis and price
statisticians. In few sectors (like high-tech services), due to their production
technology it becomes much easier to extract meaningful economic informa-
tion from hedonic regression coefficients. For price changes in service bundles
it makes more sense to explain that change by decomposing into ’constant-
quality price change’ and ’quality change.
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